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Abstract. The global financial crisis has caused massive interventions by monetary 
and fiscal authorities, such as the rehabilitation of failed banks, insurance companies and 
other financial institutions and insertion of huge amounts of money into the financial 
system, with a view to their rescuing and preventing further spread of the crisis. Such an 
environment has challenged the basic postulates underlying neoliberalism as the ruling 
economic doctrine of the 1980s. In this regard, the question is whether the imperative 
requirements for improving the financial regulatory framework have caused a substantial 
relativization of the hitherto dominant neoliberal paradigm. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The global financial and economic crisis has highlighted the need for a systemic 
approach to regulation and supervision of the financial sector, taking into consideration 
that the costs of the financial crisis are very high and that price stability is not sufficient 
for achieving financial stability, as well. In such conditions, it became necessary to revise 
the basic postulates of neoliberalism as the prevailing paradigm. Starting from the basic 
postulates of neoliberal paradigm, the analysis was performed in this paper to determine 
whether the imperative demands for financial regulatory framework improvement caused 
a substantial relativization of the hitherto dominant neoliberal paradigm. Has the time 
come for the promotion of a complex economic theory that would result from connecting 
separate parts of different economic theories, manifested in the historical development, 
which would allow the emergence of synergetic effects of the complexity economics? 
The paper is not intended to fully outline the complex economic theory, but its aim is to 
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analyze the financial regulatory framework in order to indicate possible directions of 
research. The basic postulates of this theory would be: 1) Appreciation of global trends, but 
also of the specific problems of individual national economies; 2) Every economic theory 
and economic policy should ensure the economic growth and stability at the same time.  
1. NEOLIBERAL PARADIGM AS A RULING ECONOMIC DOCTRINE  
The neoliberal paradigm, based on the neoclassical economic theory, was created 
after World War II, and since the end of the seventies of the 20th century, precisely when 
Margaret Thatcher came to power in the UK and Ronald Reagan in the US, it has become 
the ruling economic doctrine. Created in response to a major crisis of Keynesian economics, 
this paradigm is based on the theory of free trade and free market and opposes state 
intervention in the economy, protectionism, high tax rates and the like.  
The realization of the ideas of neoliberalism began after 1989, when John Williamson 
introduced a package of neoliberal economic recommendations called "Washington 
Consensus". It is the following list of suggestions: 1) Fiscal policy discipline; 2) Redirection 
of public spending from subsidies to industries towards policies for economic growth and 
support of the poor population; 3) Tax reform in the direction of lowering taxes; 4) Financial 
liberalization; 5) Competitive exchange rates; 6) Liberalization of the trade regime towards 
lifting or lowering taxes and duties on imports; 7) Openness to foreign direct investment; 
8) Privatization; 9) Deregulation and 10) Protection of property rights (Rodrik 2008, p. 143).  
The implementation of these proposals in developing countries was conducted with 
the support of the group of developed countries, along with the mediation of international 
financial institutions, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank (WB) and the 
World Trade Organization (WTO). While the IMF and the WB stipulated lending to 
developing countries by the acceptance of neoliberal policy, the WTO was bringing trade 
rules especially in those areas in which the developed countries had better predispositions 
of growth (Vrzić, 2008). Hereby, the neoliberal reforms were being implemented in a very 
discriminatory manner, in conformity with the principle of "one rule for the wealthy and 
powerful countries, the other for the poor and weak countries". Inclination towards the rich 
and powerful countries is not surprising, given that the structure of decision-making in the 
IMF and the WB is determined according to the share that a particular country has in the 
capital of the Fund, on the principle of "one dollar, one vote". In addition, the voting system 
in the World Trade Organization, although organized on the principle of one country - one 
vote, was in practice inclined exclusively to the interests of a small number of rich 
countries. While the developed countries were, through the aforementioned international 
institutions, promoting neoliberal paradigm in developing countries in order to further 
amass their own wealth, they at the same time relied precisely on the interventionist policy 
in their development policies. Hereby the awareness has spread that "the developed have 
never done what they advise the underdeveloped", and the recent crisis event has once again 
confirmed this statement.  
The global financial crisis that marked the first decade of the 21st century has triggered 
a massive intervention by monetary and fiscal authorities in most developed economies, 
thus challenging many postulates of the neoliberal paradigm. Namely, the criticism of 
neoliberalism, although actualized with the new crisis event, stems just from the elements 
that formed its basis. Stabilization, privatization and liberalization facilitated market 
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manipulation and speculation, contributed to the development of some countries to the 
detriment of others, and finally led to growing inequality in the society. This has created a 
system in which "an ever smaller number of individuals disposes of ever higher national 
income".  
Faced with the fact that every country that relied on the neoliberal paradigm in its 
development generated lower economic growth rates compared to those that were achieved 
in the era of Keynesianism, the leaders of 20 most powerful countries (G20) met in Seoul 
for the enactment of new rules that will reject neoliberal conception, propagated by the 
Washington Consensus (Kovačević, 2012, p. 42). The adoption of the Seoul Consensus 
made a shift from market to state intervention. In order to ensure a dynamic, stable and 





, where each country needs to shape its development policy in accordance 
with its own national characteristics (Dušanić, 2011).  
The severity of the financial crisis highlighted the need for a systemic approach to 
regulation and supervision of the financial sector, bearing in mind that the sector of 
financial services has a far greater impact on economic activity than it was previously 
thought. In order to increase the stability of the financial system, and hence the economic 
system as a whole, a new "re-regulation" trend was recognized. The expression "re-
regulation" emphasizes that the current system of financial regulation is based on the ex-
post concept, i.e. that it has insufficient preventive capacity. In this sense, it is rather 
informative, as it explains what has already happened. Significant costs of the financial 
crisis conditioned that special emphasis is put in the work on the basic components of the 
regulatory framework to preserve the stability of the financial system, which exhibited 
different characteristics in specific anti-crisis strategies.  
2. REGULATORY FRAMEWORK WITH A VIEW TO FINANCIAL SYSTEM STABILITY  
The regulatory role of the state and its institutions in the financial market is needed to 
the extent to which it contributes to the smooth functioning and development of financial 
markets. Banks as specific financial institutions are subject to a special regulatory regime 
that is intended to preserve the solvency of banks, to protect depositors in a situation 
where the bank is not in a position to meet its obligations, and to prevent the possibility 
of a systemic risk occurrence (Bhattacharya et al., 1998). Due to the increasing number of 
European financial institutions operating abroad as well, financial regulation has come 
into prominence as a useful instrument of market integration (Mašić, 2009).  
Since banks are the institutions through which numerous mutually conflicting interests 
are refracted, regulation of the banking sector contributes to the increase of clients' 
confidence in the bank; control of cash flows and fair distribution of financial resources 
are achieved in order to accomplish broader national economic objectives, such as a 
higher employment rate and a lower rate of inflation; the risk of bank investments is 
                                                          
1 More specifically, these are the following principles: 1) Focusing on economic growth; 2) Global partnership in 
the field of development; 3) Focus on issues of systemic character; 4) Participation of the private sector; 
5) Complementarities, and 6) Focus on concrete results.  
2 As the key areas in which reforms are most needed, the following were singled out: 1) Infrastructure; 2) Private 
investment and job creation; 3) Development of human resources; 4) Trade; 5) Availability of financial services 
(financial inclusion); 6) Economic growth along with ensuring stability; 7) Food safety; 8) Mobilization of 
domestic resources, and 9) Knowledge exchange. 
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limited, and ultimately the probability of bank bankruptcy is reduced (Bašić, 2012, p. 
190). Past experience has shown that the state, through a series of its measures, plays a 
key role in defusing the banking crises and preventing the spread of their adverse effects 
on the rest of the economy. The Swedish model of crisis management in the 90s of the 
20th century, through the establishment of public institutions to support banks (Bank 
Support Authority, Crisis Management Authority) and massive government intervention, 
confirmed the importance of the role of state in easing the banking crisis. The global 
financial crisis that marked the beginning of the 21st century has also caused massive 
government interventions and the establishment of public institution for supporting banks 
and other financial institutions.  
Thus assumed, banking regulation is indisputably directed towards a safer and more 
stable banking business. However, as banks are primarily institutions that are guided by 
the maximization of profit, they have often been forced throughout history to introduce 
numerous financial innovations, in order to "bypass" current regulations
3
. This practice of 
banks was identified as a form of "informal" deregulation (Krstić, 2003, p. 167). However, 
as the emergence of new financial instruments requires the creation of a new or 
modification of the existing regulatory framework, it launches a vicious circle in which 
regulation encourages search for ways to circumvent it through the introduction of new 
financial instruments. In such an environment of continuous alternating between regulation 
and deregulation, it is necessary to ensure effective financial intermediation which will have 
economic growth as its purpose. This requires the creation of an appropriate regulatory 
framework that will not sacrifice the economic growth to ensure financial stability and 
prevent the outbreak of crisis.  
Excessive regulation and the pursuit of international harmonization of banking 
regulations may lead to unification of banking activities, thereby suppressing the initiative 
and creativity of banks and endangering their competitive capacity (Bašić, 2012, p. 194). In 
addition, the mere application of new standards and regulations and their harmonization 
create numerous costs and require an overall adjustment, and in that sense regulation remains 
justified as long as its benefits (establishing financial stability) outweigh the costs it creates.  
The stability of the financial system implies its resistance which must be designed in 
advance. In this regard, concern for financial stability requires the design of an appropriate 
regulatory framework that includes a variety of institutions, rules and procedures (Marinković, 
2004). Accompanying the life cycle of financial institutions as its unavoidable components, 
the following were singled out: banking license policy, i.e. the rules of bank entry into the 
system, the function of lender of last resort, deposit insurance, rules and procedures governing 
intervention in the banking sector and the rules of bank exit from the system.  
2.1. Banking license policy  
Banking license policy defines the rules of bank entry into the system, i.e. the 
requirements for obtaining a license, namely: minimum cash capital required for starting a 
bank, credit worthiness of the founder, the procedure of establishing a bank, the scope of 
the banking license, i.e. permitted types of transactions, and other issues related to the 
policy of bank establishment.  
                                                          
3 Well-known examples are the introductions of financial innovations associated with the Regulation Q in the 
US (money market funds, transferable deposit certificates, NOW arrangements, etc.) and with the process of 
securitization that took place intensively both in the US and in Europe. 
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As banks are the key financial institutions in most of the financial systems, the control of 
their operations is extremely important. In the process of business internationalization of 
financial institutions, the need emerged for an international harmonization of banking 
regulations. The highest degree of harmonization of banking regulations has been achieved in 
the field of solvency regulation, as the majority of banking systems apply a unique framework 
devised within the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
4
 (Marinković, 2008, p. 238).  
The reduction of the capital base of a large number of banks around the world during 
the seventies and eighties of the 20th century resulted in the adoption of the first 
international agreement on bank capital (Basel Capital Accord), known as Basel I. It 
introduced a unique way for calculating capital adequacy ratio, expressed as the ratio 
between the capital and the credit risk weighted assets of a bank. Although these 
regulations were legally non-binding, they were initially accepted by over 100 countries 
around the world, indicating a positive attitude of the countries towards such standards. 
Despite the indisputable benefits that are reflected in the increase in the capital adequacy 
of internationally active banks, the strengthening of competitiveness of banks at the 
international level and the increased discipline in the process of capital management, 
specific shortcomings of Basel I standards were manifested after a certain period of time. 
Namely, the emphasis was placed only on credit risk, while other risks (e.g. market and 
operational risks) were ignored; in the credit risk assessment, no difference was made 
between debtors of different ratings; balance sheet items were evaluated at book rather 
than market value; and there was no adequate valorization of both modern financial 
instruments and risk mitigation techniques.  
Due to the poor adaptability of Basel I standards to changes and innovations in the 
financial market, the Committee issued a Revised Framework in June 2004, and its 
comprehensive version followed after two years in the form of Basel II standards as a new 
approach to capital management. It is based on three pillars, namely: a) the definition of 
minimum capital requirements for credit, market and operational risk (Pillar 1); b) the 
introduction of internal capital adequacy assessment (Pillar 2); and c) strengthening market 
discipline by introducing minimum requirements related to the disclosure of information on 
banks (Pillar 3).  
After the outbreak of the global financial crisis, weaknesses of the financial systems 
were identified and changes were initiated in the field of capital regulation, in terms of 
tightening regulatory requirements, particularly in the part that relates to the regulatory 
capital (the numerator of the indicator). In addition, minimum standards relating to the 
required liquidity were introduced for the first time, as well. The above changes were 
published within the standards of Basel III in June 2011 (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 2011). The countries represented in the Basel Committee have started with 
the implementation of new standards from January 1, 2013 (Matić, 2011).  
Regulatory standards for capital adequacy and liquidity of banks, alongside with their 
positive impact on financial stability, also have their negative effects which are reflected 
in the reduction of banks' profitability. In fact, by increasing their capital ratios, many 
banks reduce crediting and other placements, which are usually the main streams for 
forming the bank profits. For these reasons, the regulatory authorities have to be careful 
                                                          
4 Basel Committee for Banking Supervision (BCBS) was established by the Group of Ten (G10) countries in the 
late 1974, hosted by the Bank for International Settlements.     
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when passing new regulations, in order to establish a proper balance between stability 
and profitability of the banking sector.  
The very essence of the neo-liberal paradigm gives rise to the imperative of freedom 
of capital movements, full privatization and exclusion of the state from both the real and 
the financial sectors. As a result, transition and post-transition economies have relatively 
stable and developed financial systems, but at the same time, the same economies have 
insufficient or negative rates of economic growth and high unemployment rates. In 
particular, in the Serbian banking system, 21 of 29 operating banks are with foreign 
capital, whose share in the equity and total assets of the banking sector of Serbia is 
dominant and, according to the data for the III quarter of 2014, amounts to 60% (National 
Bank of Serbia, 2014). The assertion is well known that "the type of ownership has no 
significance", be it domestic or foreign, but the practice has shown that, when it comes to 
a crisis, foreign owners of domestic banks give priority to solving problems of their home 
countries. Furthermore, a short-term orientation of such banks and their lack of interest in 
the economic development and balanced regional development of the states in which they 
operate, as well as a reduction in lending activity are also known facts. In this sense, after 
the escalation of the global financial crisis in the second half of 2008, the question arose 
whether the banks from Western Europe that have subsidiaries in the emerging markets 
in Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe (regions) would abandon these markets. The 
problem lies in the fact that these banks are systemically important in these markets, so 
their departure would deepen the already existing systemic crisis. For this reason, on a 
proposal from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the key 
international financial institutions established in January 2009 an international framework 
for coordination and cooperation in crisis management - the Vienna Initiative. Since it 
was founded, the Vienna Initiative has been adapting to new risks and circumstances in 
the financial sector in the region, setting as its primary objective the preservation of 
stability of the financial sector in the markets of Eastern Europe, or the stimulation of 
cross-border banking groups to maintain their exposure in these markets, while ensuring 
an adequate level of solvency and liquidity of their subsidiaries. In addition, the problem 
of implementing an effective monetary policy was also noticed, being that national 
central banks have to optimize the interests of the domestic financial sector and the 
financial sector of the countries of bank capital origin in its designing. For the above 
reasons, it would be opportune that the regulatory framework sets a time limit on the 
participation of foreign capital in local banks to below 50% (in terms of the number of 
banks), for example, in a defined number of transition years (5-10 years).  
2.2. Lender of last resort function  
The function of lender of last resort represents an inevitable component of the 
infrastructure of financial system safety, although unlike other components it does not 
contain elements of obligation (Marinković, 2004). The lender of last resort function stands 
for a system of bank liquidity control and a system for support to banks with endangered 
liquidity, which are typically organized by the central monetary institution. The position of 
the central bank as the "bank of banks" entails its specific responsibility towards the 
members of the banking system (Krstić, 2003). The precondition for its intervention is by 
rule a systemic illiquidity of the banking sector and not problems of individual banks.  
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The global financial crisis and concerns about the liquidity of not only banks but also 
the entire financial system have contributed to the re-activation of the central bank's 
function as a lender of last resort. This form of liquidity support should be arranged in the 
form of short-term loans to illiquid but solvent banks that have reliable collateral and are 
ready to pay a penal interest rate. However, as it is necessary to act quickly in the 
atmosphere of crisis, and since it is very difficult then to assess the nature of the problem 
with which the bank is faced, this kind of support is being arranged mainly under 
preferential conditions (Frexias, et al., 2003; Krstić and Jemović, 2009).  
2.3. Deposit insurance  
Deposit insurance is an essential institutional component of banking and overall financial 
system, given that it preserves the confidence of depositors and prevents the run on banks in 
the conditions of their insolvency. Namely, deposits, and above all demand deposits, are an 
important component of the financial potential of banks. Being that, from the standpoint of the 
bank, these are extremely unstable sources of funding and therefore treated as risky liabilities, 
the need emerged for their special treatment in the form of protection of deposits. Thus, 
through the deposit protection, the banking system is indirectly protected as well.  
Since banks are the financial institutions with an exclusive license to perform deposit-
lending operations, their membership in the deposit insurance system is mandatory. As 
such, they are obliged to insure deposits of their clients and pay the insurance premium as 
required by the Law on Deposit Insurance. On this basis, a system of deposit insurance 
guarantees depositors the payment of deposited funds up to the insured amount if their 
deposit bank fails. When the net claim of the depositor is higher than the insured amount, 
the difference is compensated in the bankruptcy or liquidation proceedings.  
The operationalization of the deposit insurance system requires solving a number of 
questions: what scope of protection should be provided, what should be the deadline for the 
payout of deposits, what should be the structure of financing deposit schemes, what should 
be the responsibility of the institution that provides deposit insurance (a place just for the 
disbursement or also for the treatment of insolvent institutions), etc. (Ćirović, 2007, p. 425).  
Deposit insurance as a component of the system for preserving the financial system 
stability is especially gaining importance in the conditions of frequent banking crises. In 
fact, guaranteeing payment of deposits to the depositors up to the level of the insured 
amount, deposit insurance prevents a "run" on the bank, and at the same time increases 
competitiveness in the banking sector, providing the possibility for small and newly 
established banks to operate under the same conditions as larger and already existing 
banks. Deposit insurance covers the category of small depositors, because it starts from 
the assumption that small depositors are insufficiently informed about the current state of 
affairs in the bank. This is not the case with large depositors who will be the first to 
withdraw their deposits in case of disruptions in the operations of the bank, owing to 
inside information. In this sense, the deposit insurance system is reasonably directed to 
small depositors. However, the global financial crisis required a timely response in the 
sphere of deposit insurance, too. Specifically, as the previous insurance threshold proved 
insufficient, changes were made in the deposit insurance system in the direction of 
increasing the insured amount (from 50,000 to 100,000), including some other categories 
of depositors in the system of protection, as well as shortening the time limit for the 
payout of deposits to only one week.  
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2.4. The rules governing intervention in the banking sector  
and bank exit from the system 
The rules for bank exit from the system and procedures governing intervention in the 
banking sector are inevitable components of the financial regulatory framework at the end 
of the life cycle of financial institutions. Specifically, as the degree of solvency is also used as 
the main criterion for the license revocation, i.e. the bank exit from the system (Marinković, 
2008, p. 239), in a situation where the solvency of the bank is significantly undermined it will 
be assessed whether a more favorable alternative would be to revoke the license of a particular 
institution or to apply one of the measures of the banking sector restructuring aimed at 
further existence of such institution.  
The rules and procedures governing the intervention in the banking sector represent 
special regulations in the majority of legal systems, due to specificities of those institutions in 
relation to non-financial firms. Being that the insolvency of banks and other financial 
institutions poses a serious threat to financial stability, bankruptcy procedures must be 
implemented as soon as possible. A credit institution may be terminated in a regular 
procedure, or the competent authority may decide on a forced liquidation if it concludes that 
the situation can not be improved and there are no grounds for bankruptcy. If the liquidator 
finds later that a reason for bankruptcy has appeared, it shall terminate the compulsory 
liquidation and declare bankruptcy.  
Financing of interventions in the banking sector is an important item which, in the 
absence of a special fund for this purpose, as well as with the insufficient amount of the 
assets of owners and creditors, is ultimately being funded by taxpayers. The current crisis 
has confirmed this, which is why it is proposed to establish a special fund that will 
administer the intervention in the banking sector.  
3. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK ROLE IN MOST 
SIGNIFICANT ANTI-CRISIS STRATEGIES - NEGATION OF THE NEOLIBERAL PARADIGM ESSENCE 
Since the beginning of the financial crisis, central banks of leading developed countries 
have taken a number of measures to mitigate the adverse effects of the crisis and curb the 
tension that prevailed in the money market. This resulted in a significant increase in total 
assets of the central banks, with the largest increase recorded in countries that were most 
affected by the crisis, that is, in the United Kingdom and the United States. A significant 
increase in the total assets of leading central banks was also accompanied by substantial 
changes in the structure of the balance sheets of leading central banks, due to the 
implementation of many new instruments (non-standard policy measures) for combating 
the consequences of the crisis (Carpenter et al., 2013).  
Non-standard measures in support of liquidity can be divided into two groups: the 
first, directed towards the banks, and the second, directed towards key market segments. 
Although many of the instruments were abolished, due to the improvement of the 
functioning of financial markets in late 2009 and early 2010, in the following text we will 
briefly present the arrangements applied hitherto by the US Central Bank (Fed) and the 
European Central Bank (ECB).  
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In its anti-crisis strategy, the Fed applied different arrangements in the situations 
when liquidity of financial institutions or liquidity of financial assets were threatened, 
given the fact that the very concept of liquidity has two dimensions
5
.  
After the appearance of financial institutions with vulnerable liquidity in the interbank 
market in August 2007, within the measures for supporting liquidity of financial 
institutions, the Fed modified the existing and introduced new instruments closely related 
to its traditional role as a guarantor of liquidity of depository institutions. The maturity of 
this loan agreement was extended, while the borrowing costs were reduced. However, as 
the borrowing from the discount window exposed deposit institutions to considerable 
reputational risk, they opted to borrow in the interbank market rather than to use the easy 
terms of the discount window. For these reasons, only a few months after that, precisely 
in December 2007, the Fed introduced a completely new instrument, Term Auction Facility 
(TAF), which rendered support to liquidity through an auction mechanism. It pre-
determined the amount of funds that can be borrowed, as well as the maturity of the 
arrangement (initially 30, and later 90 days). A broader list of asset forms that meet the 
prescribed criteria was used as credit protection. Despite its temporary nature, TAF has 
proved to be quite a successful instrument, as demonstrated by the data on a large number 
of participants in the auction and on the total auction value. Three months after the 
introduction of TAF arrangement, in order to enable access to the discount window to a 
wider range of institutions, the Fed introduced two groups of measures: (a) Term Securities 
Lending Facility (TSLF) which is based on replacing less liquid bonds that are kept by 
primary dealers in their portfolio for more liquid bonds of the Ministry of Finance, and (b) 
the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF), providing the possibility to all financial 
institutions (banking and non-banking) acting as primary dealers to borrow from the Fed's 
discount window against a wider range of collateral. Hereby, for the first time in history, 
the Fed expanded its direct lending to investment banks which are beyond its control (for 
example, Bear Stearns).  
In the context of measures for supporting liquidity of the key market segments, in late 
2008 the Fed encountered a significant systemic risk, due to the growing instability in the 
commercial paper market. On that occasion, the Fed provided additional USD 540 billion 
to purchase commercial paper issued by companies. This was the first time since the 
Great Depression that the Fed indirectly credited activities of the private non-financial 
sector. For these purposes, the Fed introduced easy payment terms when buying high-
ranking commercial paper (Commercial Paper Funding Facility, CPFF); money market 
mutual funds (Asset Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Funds Liquidity 
Facility, AMLF); as well as securities backed by student loans, auto loans, credit cards 
(Asset-backed securities, ABS).  
Like the Fed, the ECB started relaxing its monetary policy after the first signs of the 
crisis. The worsening of the crisis and increasingly serious consequences that it brings 
along have conditioned a coordinated and immediate response of the central banks of 
most developed countries. The ECB and the central banks of Sweden, the United 
Kingdom and Switzerland have lowered their reference interest rates and turned to the 
                                                          
5 Liquidity may refer to the institution, when we talk about the liquidity of the fund i.e. institution (funding 
liquidity), or to the assets, when we talk about the liquidity of the market, i.e. assets (market liquidity). In 
analogy to the generally accepted view that the assets are liquid if they can be converted into a legal instrument 
of final payment with economically acceptable costs and in economically reasonable period of time, the 
institution will be liquid if it has more of such assets compared to liabilities.  
10 B. KRSTIĆ, M. JEMOVIĆ 
relaxation of monetary policy (Kilibarda, et al., 2011). In such conditions, lacks of capital 
and trust have made loans less available and more expensive. The resulting situation 
required the implementation of more drastic measures, which would help improve the 
system liquidity and restore the shaken confidence and prevent, to the extent possible, the 
continuation of the financial crisis and its spillover to the real sector. It was decided to 
allocate a sum of 1.700 billion euros for this purpose. The measures have referred to: 
capital injections in order to increase the liquidity and solvency of financial institutions, 
guarantees for interbank loans and guarantees on private savings of up to 50,000 euros 
per year. The high flexibility of the European Union monetary system, despite the lack of 
a centralized fiscal authority, enabled the European Central Bank, with minor changes in 
its system of work, to maintain liquidity of both individual financial institutions and asset 
markets in the first year of the crisis.  
After the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, there were significant 
disturbances in the Eurosystem's money market, which imposed the need for a radical 
change of the existing system and the introduction of non-standard measures to support 
liquidity. For the purpose of more efficient support to the liquidity of commercial banks, 
the ECB switched in mid-October to the so-called fixed rate tender procedures with full 
allotment, according to which the interested institutions could borrow desired amounts 
with the payment of fixed interest rate determined in advance by the ECB. As a 
complementary measure the ECB introduced the possibility of a long-term loan secured by 
different types of assets as collateral. Significant liquidity is also provided by the conclusion 
of currency swap contracts, most often with the Fed, as well as by the purchase of private 
bonds as the primary sources of bank financing. With the first signs of improving the 
conditions in the financial market, it was decided to start with the gradual abolition of long-
term refinancing operations and currency swaps, and to further perform tender procedure 
for the three-month long-term financing operations at variable rates.  
Previous arguments clearly show that, after the outbreak of the crisis, the Fed and the 
ECB appeared with a rather aggressive anti-crisis policy. A significant drop in reference 
interest rates alleviated the terms of conducting monetary policy, while the introduction 
of non-standard instruments provided necessary liquidity both to individual institutions and 
key market segments. Anti-crisis policy of the ECB revealed, however, certain specific 
characteristics in relation to the anti-crisis policy of the Fed, due to its focusing exclusively on 
the banking sector liquidity support (Ponce, 2010). Although different in their application, 
both anti-crisis strategies were aimed at improving the financial regulatory framework. Given 
that the current crisis scenario extorted increased state intervention, the question arises 
whether the imperative improvement of the financial regulatory framework challenges the 
basic postulates of neo-liberal paradigm, and whether the solution should be sought in a 
convergence or in a synthesis of past and current paradigms.  
4. IS THE SOLUTION IN THE SYNTHESIS AND SYNERGY OF PAST AND CURRENT PARADIGMS? 
The current financial crisis has denied the principle of laissez-faire based on market 
self-regulation, and re-actualized the need for government intervention. Specifically, with 
the deregulation of financial regulations, banking institutions as key financial intermediaries 
entered the competition with a heterogeneous group of non-bank financial institutions. A 
wave of disintermediation, i.e. reduced participation of banks in financial intermediation 
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in the 1980s, imposed the need to introduce a range of financial innovations, which should 
enable them to maintain their market position. In such circumstances, banks introduced the 
securitization of mortgage loans, having entered high-risk operations with financial 
derivatives. A high level of financial leverage, in the absence of adequate control of all 
participants in the securitization mechanism, led to huge losses in balance sheets of banks.  
In such an environment, government intervention is absolutely necessary, given that 
the market mechanism has proved to be inadequate as a coordination mechanism. In the 
book by N. Serra and J. Stiglitz, entitled "The Washington Consensus Reconsidered", it is 
emphasized that, in the conditions of growing integration in the areas of IT, production 
and civilization in the 21st century, distrust of state interventionism is impermissible 
(Drašković, 2009, p. 139). The point here is primarily the need to regulate the financial 
services sector, whose volume of transactions increased several times and exceeded the 
volume of transactions in the real sphere. However, although state intervention in the 
financial services sector is utterly indispensable indeed, the question is what the optimal 
level of intervention would be. One of the misconceptions of the financial crisis is that it is 
the consequence of inadequate regulation. It should be borne in mind that the concept of 
financial globalization is based on the model of crisis management. The most important 
segment of crisis management is the regulation at the international level, in order to 
alleviate the negative effects arising from different degrees of financial deregulation at 
individual national levels. But, deregulation effects are so large that they are getting out of 
control of both national and international regulators. Namely, economic and financial, as 
well as political power of global players has increased, and they do not allow any restriction 
of their activities. Therefore, the expectations from a tightening of regulation are unrealistic, 
because the changes have a posteriori and cosmetic character, thus ensuring the status quo 
for global players. Moreover, the regulatory changes are formal and of extremely quantitative 
range. The inability to exert a prospective effect on increasingly complex and risky 
operations of banks is compensated by stipulating large number of complicated procedures. 
It is interesting to mention the fact that the Glass-Steagall Act (GS Act) of 1933 had only 37 
pages, which did not prevent it to provide financial stability all the way to the end of the 
twentieth century. In contrast to this, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2010 has 8,500 pages and over 20,000 additional pages of supporting 
documents, specifying the members of this Act.  
There is no universal recipe for interference of the state in the financial services 
sector, but it must be adapted to the specifics of a particular national economy, as well as 
its internal and external environments. However, the fact that excessive regulation 
hinders functioning of the market, while on the other hand deregulation contributes in 
causing the financial system to be prone to crisis incidents, seems to lead to the synthesis 
and synergy of past and current paradigms. Has the time come for the promotion of a 
complex economic theory that would be the result of mixing individual parts of different 
economic theories, manifested in the historical development, which would allow the 
emergence of synergetic effects of the complex economic theory? In this sense, an 
efficient market with sufficient and adequate regulation is a key assumption of exiting the 
current global financial and economic crisis and of normal functioning of the financial 
and real spheres of economy.  
We believe that the development of economic thought so far provided enough 
economic theories and models to formulate a universal theoretical paradigm that would, 
on the one hand, have a preventive effect on the occurrence of the causes of crisis, and at 
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the first sign of crisis undertake an anti-crisis action, through the involvement of international 
and national institutions, on the other hand. Accordingly, it is time for a civilization synthesis, 
which would be underlain by the universal economic-theoretical paradigm. In fact, the 
change in the ruling paradigm would also enable a change in the political situation in the 
world and, based on that, a change in the operation of global institutions, on the one hand, 
and a change of national economic policies, on the other hand.  
At least two conclusions may be drawn from the above statements:  
1) Future economic paradigms will be less and less ideologically burdened, given the 
current trend of relativization of the ideological conflict between capitalism and 
socialism, because socialism accepts market economy as well;  
2) Former competition between socialism and capitalism will be transformed into a 
competition of different variants of the market economy, because there is a 
process of convergence of social and economic systems as a result of, among other 
things, economic and financial globalization. 
In this sense, the balance between market and state is essential. This would mean that the 
state should act in a corrective manner relative to market dysfunctions, that is, to correct 
mistakes and regulate the market in the pre-crisis period in order to avoid the crisis, or 
eliminate market deficiencies when the crisis occurs. When it is said that a balance of market 
and state is needed, it does not refer to the mathematical or absolute balance, but to a dynamic 
equilibrium that is based on the functional balance. Functional balance allows relatively stable 
and acceptable rates of economic growth, in the context of sustainable development, as well as 
an acceptable level of social justice. Considering the advanced stage of the globalization 
process, the balance will be established on two levels: 1) global and 2) national levels. 
Although globalization involves the harmonization of social, economic and financial 
institutions, instruments, mechanisms and principles, it does not necessarily mean that the 
international (global) institutions condition their economic and financial assistance to certain 
economies on their absolute acceptance of global rules of functioning. For example, 
developing countries and countries in transition cannot be expected to implement the concept 
of a fully independent central bank whose primary goal is the minimum rate of inflation, and 
that the same is not required of developed countries that manage these global institutions, and 
so on. This means that global institutions such as the IMF, WB, ECB would have at their 
disposal a wider range of possible measures to be applied to particular countries, depending on 
the specifics of their problems. At the same time, global institutions would take into account 
the specific form of balance necessary for a particular country.  
Having regard to the previous stage of equilibrium, the second one would be established 
at the level of national economies. Weights of the importance of market and economy in the 
equilibrium model would depend on the phase of the economic cycle and the condition of 
the social and environmental dimensions of society. In thus devised equilibrium model, an 
optimal ratio is established between different dimensions of man: homo economicus on one 
side, and his social and environmental dimensions on the other. In the conditions of 
economic prosperity, high rates of economic growth provide the realization of all the 
human dimensions by relatively small state interventions, meaning that the equilibrium 
model would be based on a greater weight of market significance. In the case of economic 
recession, where market dysfunctions are increasing, the equilibrium model would involve 
an increased weight of state participation in the re-establishment of optimal relations 
between different dimensions of man. Thus understood, the equilibrium model involves 
an interactive relationship between these two - global and national levels of balance.  
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CONCLUSION 
The current financial crisis has denied the principle of laissez faire, based on the self-
regulating market, and re-actualized the need for government intervention. Here it is 
primarily the issue of the need to regulate the financial services sector, whose volume of 
transactions increased several times and exceeded the volume of transactions in the real 
sphere. Considerable costs of the financial crisis caused that special emphasis is put in 
this work on the basic components of the regulatory framework for preserving the stability 
of the financial system, which exhibited different characteristics in specific anti-crisis 
strategies. Since the current crisis scenario extorted increased state intervention, the 
question raises whether the imperative improvement of the financial regulatory framework 
challenged the basic postulates of neoliberal paradigm, as well as whether the solution 
should be sought in a convergence or a synthesis of past and current paradigms.  
 A universal recipe for state interference in the financial services sector does not exist, 
but it must be adapted to the specifics of a particular national economy, as well as of its 
internal and external environments. However, the fact that excessive regulation hinders 
operation of the market, while on the other hand deregulation contributes to the inclination 
of the financial system to crisis incidents, seems to lead to the synthesis and synergy of past 
and current paradigms. In our opinion, former development of economic thought has 
provided sufficient economic theories and models to formulate a universal theoretical 
paradigm which would, on the one hand, exert a preventive effect on the occurrence of 
the causes of crisis and, if the first signs of crisis appear, take an anti-crisis action by 
involving international and national institutions, on the other hand. 
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IMPERATIVNO UNAPRERĐENJE FINANSIJSKOG 
REGULATORNOG OKVIRA – CONTRADICTIO IN ADJECTO 
NEOLIBERALNE PARADIGME 
Globalna finansijska kriza uslovila je masovne intervencije monetarnih i fiskalnih vlasti, poput 
sanacije propalih banaka, osiguravajućih društava i drugih finansijskih institucija i ubacivanja u 
finansijski sistem ogromnih količina novca, a sve u cilju njihovog spašavanja i sprečavanja daljeg 
širenja krize. U takvom ambijentu, dovedeni su u pitanje osnovni postulati na kojima počiva 
neoliberalizam, kao vladajuća ekonomska doktrina od 80-ih godina 20. veka. U tom smislu postavlja 
se pitanje da li je imperativnim zahtevima za unapređenje finansijskog regulatornog okvira izvršena 
suštinska relativizacija do tada dominirajuće neoliberalne paradigme.  
Ključne reči: neoliberalizam, globalna finansijska kriza, finansijski regulatorni okvir. 
 
